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rely on credible, transparent, and 
comparable financial information. The
Securities and Exchange Commission
has statutory authority to establish such
standards for public companies under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Throughout its history, the SEC’s pol-
icy has been to rely on the private sector
for this function to the extent that the
private sector demonstrates the ability
to fulfill the responsibility in the public
interest. In 1973, the SEC designated
the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) as the private-sector
organization in charge of establishing
the standards. Thus, the FASB estab-
lishes the guidelines that determine how
GAAP earnings can be measured.
The most comprehensive measure of
earnings under GAAP is net income. Net
income is the difference between total
sales and both total costs and expenses
from operations plus income or less
losses from other sources. Total costs
comprise the cost of goods sold, includ-
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Revelations of corporate fraud in
2002 shook the public’s confidence in
financial reporting and led to calls for
reform. Without credible, transpar-
ent, and comparable financial infor-
mation, investors, auditors, and oth-
ers cannot make decisions that are
essential to the efficient functioning of
the economy. But while rules can be
improved, it is not possible to achieve
a rigid standard that applies uni-
formly to every company. This 
Economic Commentary explains why. 
For many years, I’ve had little confi-
dence in the earnings reported by most
corporations. I’m not talking about
Enron and WorldCom—examples of out-
right crookedness. Rather I am referring
to the legal, but improper, accounting
methods used by chief executives to
inflate reported earnings.
— Warren Buffett
New York Times, July 24, 2002
Revelations of corporate fraud over
the past year or so have clearly shaken
investor confidence. No doubt the
equity market’s poor performance in
2002 can be attributed in some part to
heightened uncertainty about the quality
of financial reports—especially those
regarding quarterly earnings. The qual-
ity of earnings reports concerns more
than just illegal practices. Even when
they stay within the bounds of legal
accounting practices, there is concern
about whether the reports provide
investors information appropriate for
assessing the value of a firm. 
The possibility that legal but improper
accounting practices contributed to the
recent stock market woes has fostered a
public debate about existing accounting
practices. This Commentary briefly
reviews some key issues and describes
alternative methods and measures used
to report earnings. We assess the implica-
tions of alternative accounting practices
for stock price valuation to highlight the
economic issues.
n Some Key Issues
One recent practice receiving closer
scrutiny is that of public companies
developing and reporting their own mea-
sures of earnings in press releases. Such
measures—so-called pro forma, street,
or operating earnings—differ from the
measure of earnings defined by gener-
ally accepted accounting principles—
GAAP earnings—in that they omit a
variety of nonrecurring, noncash, and
other miscellaneous items. Although full
reports typically contain GAAP earnings
somewhere within, the company-defined
measures are most prominently featured.
The crux of the matter is whether firms
use this practice to exaggerate earnings
and thereby mislead investors.
Figure 1 compares Standard and Poor’s
measures of GAAP and operating earn-
ings per share for its S&P 500 index.
Because the items excluded are most
often expenses or other charges against
income, the company-defined measures
generally exceed GAAP earnings, offer-
ing a more upbeat representation of a
firm’s performance. Indeed, the company-
defined earnings have been wryly referred
to as “earnings before the bad stuff.” Not
only are operating earnings typically
larger than GAAP earnings, the discrep-
ancy is widening. 
Some observers note that the potential
for earnings exaggeration arises even
under GAAP. For example, under cur-
rent GAAP rules, firms are not required
to expense the value of employee stock
options, an omission that critics claim
results in earnings overstatement. Also,
GAAP treatment of pension expenses
allows for a significant amount of com-
pany discretion and hence the potential
for manipulation of GAAP earnings. 
n Accounting Standards
Financial accounting and reporting 
standards are essential to the efficient
functioning of the economy because
investors, creditors, auditors, and othersing depreciation of plant, equipment,
and other capital goods. Total expenses
comprise selling, general, and adminis-
trative expenses and include financing
costs and taxes. 
The rules also allow for a narrow set of
exclusions from net income related to
discontinued operations, extraordinary
items, and the effects of cumulative
changes in accounting practices. Extra-
ordinary items are transactions or events
that are both unusual in nature and
infrequent in occurrence. Examples are
charges related to floods, hurricanes,
earthquakes, and so forth. GAAP 
earnings are defined as net income from 
continuing operations, which is net
income excluding the narrow set of 
prescribed transactions or events. 
n Economic Perspective
Although GAAP-based rules provide
for a credible, transparent, and compara-
ble earnings benchmark, it is not evident
that such a measure is the most relevant
for an investor trying to assess the fun-
damental value of the firm. From an
economic perspective, the value of a
firm is determined by the present value
of future cash payouts, usually in the
form of dividends. A firm can sustain
such payouts only if it can generate a
stream of future earnings. 
A key implication of this perspective is
that current earnings represent only a
small contribution to the value of a
firm. Nevertheless, changes in current
earnings often contain information
about future earnings. On the other
hand, current earnings may contain an
item, say a nonrecurring cost, which is
not representative of future costs. In
such cases, it may be appropriate to
exclude the item from reported earnings
to give investors a clearer picture of the
value of the firm. 
n Are Exclusions
Unimportant?
When ascertaining the appropriateness
of exclusions, the point is whether earn-
ings reports exclude items that are truly
nonrecurring and thus unimportant for
the value of the firm. To address this
issue one needs to examine whether the
exclusions are at all related to the firm’s
future performance and hence funda-
mental value. A recent study by
accountants Doyle, Lundholm, and 
Soliman investigates this very question
using a large sample of quarterly earn-
ings reports from 1988 to 1999. 
They find that excluded expenses are far
from unimportant. Rather, higher levels
of exclusions are associated with lower
future cash flows. They also find that
investors do not fully appreciate the
lower-cash-flow implications at the time
of the earnings announcements. Indeed,
they show that an investment strategy
based on the excluded expenses pro-
duces a large abnormal positive return in
the years following the announcement
and persists. This suggests that many
investors may have been misled by
firms’use of pro forma earnings.
The study also breaks exclusions into
two categories, special items and other
exclusions. Special items, like extraor-
dinary items, are nonrecurring but are
from a much broader class of transac-
tions or events. Special items may be
either unusual or infrequent. Examples
of special items include restructuring
charges, asset write-downs, or losses on
the sale of assets. Other exclusions are
the residual—the difference between
total exclusions in the earnings reports
and special items—and are not easily
defined. The study finds that when 
special items and other exclusions are
treated separately in the analysis, only
other exclusions are statistically associ-
ated with lower earnings. These results
suggest that investors need to examine
carefully the nature of each item
excluded. The fuzzier the excluded
item, the more likely its importance for
assessing future earnings. On the other
hand, some items are unimportant for
the value of the firm, and their exclu-
sion is warranted. Flexibility in the 
presentation of income components is
justified under such circumstances.
Unfortunately, the distinction between
special items and other exclusions is not
always obvious. In practice, it would
seem doubtful that any uniform standard
could be applied. The FASB issues occa-
sional statements that provide some
guidance. What is truly infrequent or
nonrecurring, however, will always be
subject to judgment. For example, when
firms restructure, they often treat the
related severance costs as a special item.
Are such costs truly nonrecurring? Firms
in declining industries may undergo 
several phases of restructuring. 
More research is clearly needed. It
would seem useful to examine whether
the results in the Doyle, Lundholm, and
Soliman study were driven by compa-
nies that were later exposed for fraud.
Whether or not that turns out to be the
case, it seems likely that investors will
have learned from their recent experi-
ences and will be more skeptical of the
measures featured in press releases. It will
be interesting to see whether the study’s
results hold up with additional data.
n Accounting for Employee
Stock Options
Under current GAAP rules, firms are 
not required to expense employee stock
options (ESOs), even though the value of
the option is deductible from corporate
income for tax purposes when the option
is exercised. When ESOs are omitted
from expenses, it tends to inflate mea-
sured earnings at the time the ESOs are
granted. Researchers Liang and Sharpe
note, however, that earnings per share
decline at the time options are exercised
because earnings are divided by a greater
number of shares.
The debate concerning whether to
expense ESOs has revealed some glar-
ing economic misconceptions. Some
opponents of expensing options have
claimed they are cost-free and hence
should not be expensed. Such a claim 
is clearly fallacious. ESOs have value
and are a form of compensation. Firms
that grant ESOs can offer lower wages
and salaries. 
There is compelling evidence in the
aggregate compensation numbers of the
late 1990s that ESO grants were indeed
a substitute for cash compensation. This
was a period during which the economy
and productivity were accelerating.
These are conditions under which one
might expect to find rising rates of com-
pensation, but growth in compensation
per hour was actually falling. Labor
economists found this to be puzzling.
Research by New York Fed economists
Mehran and Tracy, however, showed
that the puzzle was resolved when the
value of ESOs was incorporated into
total compensation.
Accounting for the value of ESOs is not
a simple matter. What matters for the
viability of the firm is the total compen-
sation it must pay to keep valued
employees. Ideally, one would want to
incorporate the ESO value at the time it
is granted because it would correspond
to current compensation. ESOs, how-
ever, are very complicated contracts
about uncertain future payments, and
thus involve sophisticated pricing 
models. Because such models involveseveral assumptions, some advocates
argue for expensing options at the time
they are exercised. 
It is worth noting that the corporate
profit measure in the National Income
and Product Accounts expenses stock
options for the value they create for
employees at the time they are exer-
cised. Standard and Poor’s estimates the
value of ESOs using standard models.
They estimate that expensing ESOs
would reduce S&P 500 GAAP earnings
by almost 20 percent in the 12 months
ending June 2002.
Since this issue resurfaced in recent
years, the number of firms voluntarily
treating ESOs as an expense has jumped
sharply. In 2001, only two firms in the
S&P 500 expensed their ESOs. In 2002,
more than 100 have indicated they will
report income measures that expense
ESOs, and the issue is under review 
at FASB. 
n Accounting for Pension
Funds
Another accounting issue is the treat-
ment of pension fund costs or gains.
About 70 percent of the S&P 500 firms
offer defined-benefit pension plans.
Under such plans, the firms are obligated
to pay future benefits to current and
retired employees. The benefits are 
specified by a formula that takes account
of an employee’s years of service and
final average salary. These plans use 
pension asset funds that contain stocks
and bonds to cover future obligations. 
As obligations grow and the market
value of the fund varies, pension funds
can vacillate between being overfunded
and underfunded. 
Firms contribute to the fund as needed
to keep it roughly balanced. FASB rules
specify a method for determining the
amounts to be expensed. Because mar-
ket valuation variations are often transi-
tory, individual firms are given some
discretion to estimate the plan’s fund
value using a method that ignores the
actual recent performance of the asset
fund. Essentially, pension expenses
depend on the expected value of future
portfolio returns. 
Because portfolio holdings vary from
firm to firm, one firm may choose an
expected return of 10 percent, while
another may choose one of 6 percent.
An assumption of higher projected
returns requires lower contributions to
be expensed against current earnings. 
In essence, there is no uniform standard,
and corporations can effectively manip-
ulate earnings numbers if they choose.
Another concern is that under GAAP,
firms are allowed to include pension
plan gains in their reported net income
even though the pension fund is not
part of their core business. 
To provide a better benchmark for core
earnings, Standard and Poor’s has 
proposed an adjustment method to
limit the discretionary element of 
pension fund expenses. Moreover, 
they exclude pension fund gains from
company income, since such gains are
not generated by core operations. Their
pension fund adjustment method
reduces GAAP earnings of the S&P
500 by approximately 25 percent for
the year ending June 2002. Their tech-
nique introduces substantial variation
to their earnings estimate. While this
may not be useful for assessing the
value of the firm, it provides a clear
standard against which firms would
have to justify their assumptions.
What’s more, S&P’s adjustment can
serve to provide a red flag for potential
pension problems ahead.
n Caveat Investor
Accounting and reporting standards are
essential to the efficient functioning 
of the economy because investors, 
creditors, auditors, and others rely on
credible, transparent, and comparable
financial information. It is impossible,
however, to develop a standard that
applies to every contingency. No single
measure can be best for all circum-
stances. Some exclusions from GAAP
earnings, for example, may be warranted
on the basis that the excluded item is not
relevant for assessing the future perfor-
mance of the company. Tension will
always exist between the need for a rigid
standard and some flexibility. 
Investors must examine earnings
reports carefully and make their own
judgment about company-defined mea-
sures. Firms that abuse their discretion
will lose credibility, and the value of
the company will suffer. The experi-
ence of the late 1990s suggests that
investors were too credulous. One
might expect, however, that lessons
were learned, and investors will
demand better information. Firms will
be more prudent to regain credibility.
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FIGURE 1 GAAP AND OPERATING EARNINGS PER SHARE, S&P 500
a.  Standard and Poor’s calls these “as-reported earnings.”
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Transparency is always important. 
Concerns about accounting for ESOs
and pension expenses may lead to
changes in accounting rules. In any
case, the public debate will likely
impose some form of discipline. Firms
are becoming increasingly willing to
include ESOs in their own earnings
measures. Moreover, some recent earn-
ings reports offer alternative implica-
tions of a range of assumptions about
pension fund returns. By providing an
array of information, investors can
choose their own assumptions.
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